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Rumour and Politics 
Abstract 
 
This article examines the historiography of rumour and its relationship to other 
disciplines, particularly psychology. The article explores the methodological 
problems of defining rumours and interpreting source material, as well as the 
limitations of psychological interpretations. It examines the ways in which rumours 
can allow us to access pass mentalities and understand popular and elite politics. It 
analyses attempts by governments to monitor rumours and what they can tell us 
about the relationship between the individual and the state. Finally, it explores how 
the interpretations of rumours shaped, and were shaped by, race, gender, social 
differences, and cultural attitudes. Although social scientists and historians have 
approached the study of rumour in very different ways, closer collaboration 
between the two can illuminate our understanding of this complex and fascinating 
phenomena. 
Introduction 
 
The circulation of rumours and the assessment of news is a pressing public issue. The 
easy accessibility of information and misinformation via the internet has created a 
news culture in which rumours spread rapidly and individuals can easily find ‘facts’ 
to support their conspiracy theory of choice. Although the internet has provided a 
forum for whistle-blowing and created opportunities for ‘citizen journalism’, it has 
also damaged the ability of traditional media to investigate reports and sift fact from 
fiction by depriving newspapers of readers and advertising revenues. At the same 
time, the pressure on twenty-four hour news channels to broadcast stories before 
fully checking facts has led to an increase in the circulation of misinformation. Alan 
Rusbridger, the editor of The Guardian, recently raised fears that, ‘for the first time 
since the Enlightenment, it’s possible to imagine societies — towns, cities, and even 
countries — without any agreed or verifiable forms of the truth’.1 We might question 
whether ‘agreed or verifiable forms of the truth’ have ever existed, and doubt the 
accuracy and social utility of traditional media. Nevertheless, fears remain that the 
continuing decline of print and TV journalism could create a much more fragmented 
and unmediated news culture. 
 
 Rumour has always been an urgent concern, connected intimately with the 
politics of governance, the construction of community, and notions of state stability. 
This article will examine the disparate historiography of rumour and its relationship 
to other disciplines, notably psychology. While historians and social scientists have 
adopted very different approaches towards understanding rumours, they have each 
influenced the other, and even closer collaboration between the two could greatly 
enhance our understanding of this endlessly fascinating phenomenon. At the same 
time, historians need to challenge generalised notions underpinning experimental 
psychology to point to a more differentiated engagement with rumour that is 
dependent on varied cultural norms and distinctive temporal contexts.  
Methodological problems 
 
Georges Lefebvre’s examination of the ‘Great Fear’ of 1789 was in some respects a 
false dawn for the study of rumour. Lefebvre was able to chart rumours concerning 
the imminent attack of ‘brigands’ and foreign mercenaries across France in 1789 in 
impressive detail, demonstrating how popular fears influenced the course of the 
French Revolution. By using rumour to examine collective mentalities, Lefebvre 
appeared to offer a methodology that could fruitfully be applied to other periods, 
yet initially, few historians seemed interested in replicating his approach. Early 
claims that historians failed to respond to Lefebvre’s clarion call are no longer 
sustainable, however.2 In fact, the mobilization of rumour across history’s many sub-
disciplines has provided a rich and complex discussion about its place in 
understanding popular belief systems, behaviours, and dominant mentalities, as well 
as questioning the psychological function of rumour transmission. However, the field 
is characterised more by its diversity than its ability to provide a distinctive 
methodological model that can be generically applied. While the historical specificity 
of any given region or period raises its own issues and complications, there is a 
common set of methodological problems that confront the historian of rumour.  
 
The first is that of definition.3 What distinguishes rumour from gossip, 
speculation, and early articulations of ‘news’? While gossip is socially and culturally 
important, it generally concerns information about the personal lives of individuals 
and circulates in small communities. Rumours, on the other hand, might circulate on 
a national or international scale and often relate to collective hopes and fears that 
reach beyond the moral behaviour of individuals. While news generally denotes 
information that has been confirmed or generally accepted as true, rumour refers to 
uncertain or unverified information.  
 
While excessively broad definitions of rumour render the term meaningless, 
preventing us from identifying the phenomena we are trying to analyse, more 
specific definitions tend to fall apart on closer inspection. Rumours overlap with 
other forms of communication, and exceptions abound. A rumour that a monarch 
has a new mistress, for instance, might be categorised as both ‘gossip’ within the 
court and ‘rumour’ beyond it. Furthermore, if we are to define rumours as uncertain 
or unverified news, almost all reports could be categorised as such. Indeed it could 
be argued that all news was initially ‘rumour’, particularly in the predominantly oral 
news cultures of the past. The marginal annotations of seventeenth-century news 
diarists, who wrote ‘proved true’ or ‘false’ next to reports, indicates that information 
only attained the status of fact after it had been confirmed days or weeks later.4 The 
sociologist Tamotsu Shibutani has argued that rumours only become news when a 
stable consensus about their truth is reached.5 One might ask whether a unanimous 
consensus about the veracity of a report ever develops, since there will always be 
those who believe in the truth of a rumour long after others have ceased to believe 
it. 
 
Leonard W. Doob’s assertion that ‘a clear-cut definition of propaganda is 
neither possible nor desirable’ could be applied equally to rumour.6 Any 
commitment to a single root meaning of the term merely invites endless and 
unprofitable semantic debate and risks excluding reports that we would intuitively 
describe as ‘rumours’. Rumours are typically, but not exclusively, unverified or 
uncertain, and concern matters that are important to large numbers of people, 
beyond the personal behaviour of individuals. Individual reports can exhibit features 
that are more or less characteristic of this ideal type.7 
 
The second major methodological problem historians face relates to the body 
of material on which to draw. Rumour is often, by its very nature, difficult to 
capture: it is ephemeral and frequently perceived as inconsequential, not worthy of 
entering the record. In any case, it is primarily transferred orally. When rumour is 
recorded, how do we know what has been lost? Rumours have been used to recover 
the voices of ordinary people, yet they are often recorded in the official documents 
of regimes that sought to monitor or punish those who spread seditious reports. 
There are formidable methodological difficulties in recovering authentic plebeian 
voices that have been filtered through elite sources, and there is a danger of 
repeating early modern elite stereotypes about the susceptibility of the uneducated 
multitude to false news. As Adam Fox has pointed out, early modern government 
records tend to preserve only the most extreme and dangerous words spoken by 
ordinary people, although a careful reading allows us to discern more measured 
criticisms.8 Does the relative abundance or dearth of government evidence for 
different periods reflect the volume of rumours circulating, the extent of 
government concern about them, or is it simply an artefact of improved bureaucratic 
processes and the survival of source material? 
 
Why do some rumours persist and others fade? And when rumours are 
resurrected in new contexts, has the fundamental character of the rumour changed? 
How do historians trace the origins and provenance of a rumour, so crucial to 
understanding its intention? Indeed, does intention even matter, if we consider the 
process of rumour transmission the more historically significant? How do rumours 
travel? Can we map the course of a rumour, and what does its trajectory reveal? 
Even if historians could overcome such challenges, is it helpful or desirable to force 
such a complex phenomenon into an artificial theoretical or interpretative 
framework? Rumour is far too fragmented and contradictory. As Luise White 
concludes in her study of rumours of Vampirism in colonial Africa, ‘there is no single 
correct interpretation of any single rumour; there are interpretations and 
contextualisations instead’.9 Arguably historians should seek out and embrace the 
ambiguities and fractures within the content and passage of rumours, alongside the 
resonances and continuities, in order to understand, as Nick Stargardt suggests, the 
‘profoundly dissonant qualities of human subjectivity’.10 It is, after all, rumour’s 
ability to hold all these elements in tension with one another that make it a 
particularly appealing, if complicated, object for historical study.   
 
Despite the methodological difficulties inherent in any study of rumour, 
historians of the phenomenon remain convinced of its fundamental significance to 
the political process, identity formations, societal dynamics, and an understanding of 
individual and collective behaviours and mind-sets. Rumour may be a window onto 
prevailing mentalities and belief systems, the attempt by the disenfranchised to 
articulate their views, and a mechanism for those views to enter the public sphere. 
Rumours are generated by deep-seated psychological needs, and while those needs 
are difficult to interpret, they provide an opportunity to access lost mentalities and 
forgotten constituencies.  
Psychology 
 
Historians have tended to focus on two foundational psychological studies to inform 
their discussion of rumour, both borne of the experience and so-called ‘lessons’ of 
war. The first, Gordon Allport’s and Leo Postman’s The Psychology of Rumor, 
published in 1947, used experimental research, alongside knowledge of 
psychoanalysis and (often anecdotal) insights gleaned from wartime ‘rumour-clinics’ 
that attempted to monitor and contain damaging reports, to understand the 
mechanisms through which rumours spread. They attempted to recreate in an 
experimental setting the process of communication through which rumours were 
thought to emerge. A test subject was shown an ambiguous image of an everyday 
scene and asked to describe it to someone else from memory. The second person 
would then relay what they had been told to a third, without reference to the 
original image, and without being able to question or clarify the description they 
were given. When the descriptions given by each subject were compared, they were 
shown to become shorter, more memorable and less ambiguous as they were 
passed on. Subjects increasingly imputed meaning to events and motives to the 
people depicted in the scenes, and the descriptions became distorted, exaggerated 
and simplified in accordance with the subjects’ pre-existing beliefs and prejudices. 
Allport’s and Postman’s work in itself becomes a revealing object of historical study, 
since it reflected both official anxieties over the impact of rumours on civilian morale 
in a time of ‘total war’ alongside an optimism about the ability of science and the 
state to understand and solve human problems, in keeping with trends in sociology, 
social psychology, and political science following the First World War.11 However, as 
a template for probing the psychology of rumour, it is insufficient. While some 
elements of their work anticipated the more nuanced research that was to follow, 
Allport and Postman presented rumour as a pathological and irrational distortion of 
the truth, a further reflection of scientific and popular obsessions following the 
trauma of two wars and the ‘revelations’ of supposed ‘falsehoods in wartime’. 
Consequently, their approach was reductionist, presenting rumour as the result of 
individual psychological traits and errors of communication.12 Overly dependent on 
scientism, they used an equation, ‘r = i x a’ to describe the conditions in which 
rumours arose, where ‘i’ is the importance of a topic and ‘a’ is the ambiguity that 
surrounds it. While this gave their argument a specious air of mathematical rigour, 
complex human interactions such as the process of rumour-formation cannot be 
reduced to simple generalizable laws.  
 
Moreover, their experimental approach simplified the process of 
transmission to such a degree that it bore little resemblance to reality, and it tells us 
much more about the unreliability of eyewitness testimony than it does about the 
circulation or rumour. In reality, rumours are not simply spread from one person to 
another in a serial chain. Individuals check information, clarify reports and gather 
news from multiple sources. They are much more concerned with the accuracy of 
reports, which affect both their own view of the world and their credibility with 
others, than Allport’s and Postman’s disinterested test subjects. The overall effect 
was to present those who spread rumours as rather more credulous and irrational 
than they really were.13  
The second seminal work for historians of rumour, Tamotsu Shibutani’s 
Improvised News: a sociological study of rumor in 1966, was also influenced by the 
experience of the Second World War, although these led Shibutani to very different 
conclusions.14 As a young Japanese-American man, he had been interned shortly 
after the U.S. joined the war, and had witnessed the rumours that circulated within 
the Japanese community as it attempted to understand and come to terms with 
internment.15 Shibutani was thus an observer and participant in the process of 
rumour formation, and based his conclusions on real-life examples rather than 
experimental data. He characterised the circulation of rumours as a process through 
which individuals collectively formulated explanations for ambiguous situations. 
While Allport and Postman tended to present rumours as potentially dangerous, 
irrational, and pathological, Shibutani argued that they were part of the normal and 
self-correcting process through which communities attempted to explain events. 
While Allport and Postman were concerned with managing rumours and preventing 
them from spreading, Shibutani argued that the spread of rumours was 
uncontrollable.16 Attempting to plant a rumour was pointless, because it would only 
catch on under the same conditions in which it would have developed spontaneously 
anyway.17 Official denials were often counter-productive, and attempts to manage 
rumours were likened to trying to stop a lynch mob.18 In general, Shibutani 
presented an optimistic view of the collective, democratic process of sense-making 
and the futility of attempts by governments to control or manipulate opinion.  
 
 Despite the fact that psychological studies have arguably moved on since the 
1960s, historians have placed disproportionate emphasis on Allport’s, Postman’s, 
and Shibutani’s research. This is partly because their findings remained the 
prevailing orthodoxy until the 1990s. And while more recent scholarship has 
attempted to test or elaborate on the work of Allport, Postman and Shibutani, or 
reconcile their different approaches, progress has been incremental: no single work 
has advanced our understanding so profoundly as these foundational texts. 
Nonetheless, while scholars such as Ralph Rosnow have challenged the dominance 
of scientism and have embraced Shibutani’s model of rumour as a ‘sense-making’ 
activity, psychologists have still tended to treat rumours as dangerous and have 
increasingly focused on practical ways in which businesses and other organisations 
can manage them.19 Historical studies point to rather different conclusions. Social 
scientific approaches often present rumour as a timeless and universal phenomenon 
and are dependent on isolated and de-contextualised historical examples. Historians 
reject the notion of rumour as a solely trans-national or trans-historical 
phenomenon: while aspects of rumour formulation and circulation may transcend 
national and temporal boundaries, they continue to recognise the historical 
specificity of particular rumours. Here, psychological research is transformed into a 
focus for questions surrounding human behaviour and interaction, power, agency, 
community formation, government stability, mentalities, and emotions applied to 
and tested in particular historical contexts and environments. From this basis, 
historians are able to interpret rumour as reflective of broader notions of continuity 
and change.   
 
Popular and elite politics 
 
The study of rumour offers a means to examine popular politics, mentalities and 
behaviours, allowing us to re-insert those without a voice into the historical 
narrative. While historians once believed that the common people knew little about 
politics, records of rumours, libels and other seditious speech indicated that the 
early modern ‘public sphere’ included those beyond the traditional political elite.20 
The circulation of political rumours demonstrates that even relatively humble people 
in late medieval and early modern England were sufficiently well informed to engage 
in political discussion, even if their views were sometimes distorted.21 Similar 
conclusions have been drawn about rumours circulating in France during the latter 
half of the eighteenth century.22 Far from being hapless victims and unwitting 
conduits for rumour, the common people emerge from the historiography as active 
agents, with the ability to mobilize rumour for their own ends. 
 
Historians of the modern period have similarly invested the masses them 
with a new significance and agency, challenging existing orthodoxies on power and 
political will. This had particular resonance in repressive or ‘restrictive’ 
environments.23 Where subversive talk was dangerous, rumour offered the 
opportunity to express opinion ‘at a distance’ (‘I heard that…’; ‘Someone told me 
that…’). Rumour is, by its very nature’ ‘cloaked in anonymity’, according to Steven 
Hahn, proving appealing to ‘subalterns’ in search of fluid, transient and untraceable 
forms of communication.24 Hahn argues that for African Americans in the 
antebellum South rumours of emancipation and the redistribution of plantation land 
represented a ‘[safe] way… to introduce themselves as political actors’.25  Plantation 
owners went to considerable lengths to hermetically seal their slaves within the 
South, so as not to expose them to ‘seditious’ whispers of the Free North.26 The 
‘grapevine’ – a series of underground ‘networks of communication’ between 
captives – bound a disparate community together in which sharing informal news 
became a form of power, breaking the enforced isolation imposed by the slave 
owners and providing a means of speculating on the meaning, progress and 
consequences of the Civil War.27  
 
Lynne Viola’s work on Stalin’s brutal collectivization policies reveal that 
rumour provided the peasantry with the means of articulating an alternative world-
view challenging communism. Rumour permitted a form of resistance in a repressive 
environment, where dissent activated the mechanisms of the terror state. 
Strategically placed rumours mobilized folk traditions and religious language to cast 
collectivization as an apocalyptic act that threatened the existence of the 
community.  In a state where language was power and an indicator of ideological 
conformity – take, for example, the act of ‘speaking Bolshevik’28 – the peasantry 
deliberately infused rumours with religious imagery and phraseology as a defiant 
defence of a past identity that the Soviets sought to erase and in order to legitimize 
their political claims.29  This, Viola contends, was a ‘language of protest distilled 
through metaphor… which was both politically expedient and widely understood’. 
Rumour ‘represented a kind of off-stage social space for the articulation of peasant 
dissent…, a popular forum… in the abstract in which peasants could create and 
maintain a political dialogue about Soviet power, communism and the collective 
farm’.30 While historians have pointed to the particular resonance of rumours in 
‘totalitarian’ societies, under both dictatorships and liberal democracies, rumour 
provided a check to state-orchestrated propaganda campaigns, serving as an 
important corrective to official narratives that the people did not consider credible.31 
 
Although rumours reveal that ordinary people often had extensive 
knowledge about current affairs and were quite capable of engaging in political 
debate, rumours were also spread by elites. Historians who have relied on the court 
records of individuals prosecuted for spreading false reports in early modern 
England have tended to present rumour as an essentially plebeian mode of 
discourse, and have underestimated the involvement of elites in spreading and 
exploiting misinformation. Taking their cue from Shibutani, some historians have 
tended to represent rumour as an uncontrollable popular force. Ethan Shagan has 
argued that rumours circulating during the reign of Henry VIII were ‘the stuff of 
popular politics'.32 Because every person who passed on a rumour was free to add 
their own gloss and manipulate its content and meaning, rumours were ‘free from 
government control, or indeed from any control at all’.33 ‘Inventing a rumour’, as 
Shagan argued, was therefore ‘the most insignificant of acts’.34  
 
The emphasis on the protean and collective aspect of rumours only tells part 
of the story, however. While individuals may have had little control over the ways in 
which rumours spread and were interpreted, they were certainly capable of 
providing the initial spark without which specific rumours may have lain dormant. 
Rumours that the Duke of Buckingham had poisoned Charles I that gripped the 
South-West of England in 1628 had originated when a thief shouted the report to 
distract a crowd that was pursuing him.35 There are numerous occasions when 
members of the social elite appear to have spread false reports deliberately for 
political purposes, such as in 1470 when Robert Welles, the son of a nobleman, 
spread the report that Edward IV was coming to Lincolnshire to destroy the 
commons.36 Members of the social elite who were in a position of authority, who 
might have access to reliable information or connections with the court, could also 
lend popular rumours far greater credibility than they would otherwise have had. 
This was the case, for instance, with reports about the death of Henry VIII that were 
spread in the 1530s.37  
 
Despite the outward fear and disdain elites expressed for 'vulgar rumours', in 
practice they were often willing to spread and exploit them for their own political 
purposes. Rulers from early modern monarchs to twentieth century politicians and 
dictators could be just as susceptible to rumours as the people they ruled. Rumours 
that circulated throughout the country often originated at the centre of government, 
which was itself a site for rumours about the ‘who’s in and who’s out’ of factional 
politics.38 False reports about foreign invasions and conspiracies against the 
government could be spread at court by relatively humble people who expected 
some reward or wanted to influence policy.39 Rumours can therefore be seen as the 
result of a dialogue between elite and popular politics.  
Rumour and the state 
 
Rumours have the potential to stoke riot and rebellion, and governments 
throughout history have often attempted to monitor and suppress them. During the 
medieval and early modern periods, rumours that the monarch had died, that new 
taxes would be imposed, that a foreign army was about to invade or that a long-
dead monarch had returned to claim the throne all had the potential to provoke or 
legitimate rebellions. Rumours about the morality and sexual behaviour of the 
monarch could also play a part in undermining royal authority. As a result, medieval 
and early modern monarchs imposed a series of laws and proclamations aimed at 
suppressing false rumours and other potentially seditious forms of speech, including 
libels and political prophecies. While political rumours were certainly not new, some 
historians have detected an increased concern about them during the fifteenth 
century in England, perhaps as a result of the crises of legitimacy faced by a 
succession of Lancastrian and Yorkist kings.40 The crisis of legitimacy provoked by the 
reformation intensified these efforts.41 A rash of new laws were introduced in the 
1530s, and there was a sharp increase in the number of prosecutions for various 
forms of seditious speech. Anxieties about dynastic security under a minor and two 
female monarchs, as well as the continuing religious divisions that exacerbated the 
threat of rebellion and foreign invasion, meant that additional laws were introduced 
by the later Tudors.  
 
Given the potential for rumour to undermine the authority of the State and 
encourage political intervention from the disenfranchised, modern governments also 
went to great lengths – particularly at times of war or crisis – to counter the effects 
of subversive rumours. Psychology was increasingly used, particularly by the mid-
20th century, to serve these ends.  In such contexts, rumour became associated with 
the ‘Other’, with enemies who might spread rumour to undermine morale at times 
of war or with those seeking to undermine law and order.42 Regarded as inherently 
seditious, rumour was perceived as a driver of change, destabilizing civil society. 
Race riots in 20th century America have proved fertile ground for scholars seeking to 
demonstrate rumour’s potential to incite rebellion: the East St Louis riot (1917), the 
Chicago riot (1919), the Belle Isle, Detroit, riot (1943), and the Harlem riots (1935-43) 
were all prompted by rumour.43 Riots are the physical manifestation of the 
dissonance between authority and the mass, and point to a perceived failure to 
deliver justice, protect democratic rights, and ensure representation on the one 
hand, and the presence of rebellious intent on the other. The suspicion that the 
state was stealing the children of the Parisian underclass in 1750 was created by the 
mistrust of the local police force, while the authorities blamed revolutionary 
agitators intent on inflaming the masses.44  
 
Governments were not always fearful about the threat of seditious rumours, 
however, and some regimes were capable of taking a more relaxed approach. In 
Dangerous Talk, David Cressy argued that during the eighteenth century, 
prosecutions in England for seditious words declined and punishments became less 
severe.45 The reasons for this apparent decline remain unclear. Perhaps eighteenth-
century governments simply had greater means of coercion and were less worried 
about the threat of popular rebellion. The expansion of the ‘public sphere’ after the 
Civil War may have led successive regimes to conclude that false rumours, along 
with other forms of political discourse, were now impossible to suppress. While 
governments throughout history have attempted to monitor rumours, it remains to 
be seen why they generated more concern at certain times and within certain 
regimes than others. A broad, comparative approach to the history of rumour is 
required to answer these questions.  
 
While the circulation and monitoring of rumour might seem to imply a 
simple, adversarial relationship between people and their governments, more recent 
studies suggest a more complex picture. Rumour can no longer be said simply to 
divide and destabilize societies or to prompt insurrection and violence. Rumour 
potentially represents a site for negotiation between the individual and the state, for 
identity formation, and for engagement with the community. As Andy Wood has 
argued, the circulation of seditious rumours in early modern England should not lead 
us to exaggerate the amount of popular opposition to royal policies. The only reason 
seditious words came to the attention of the government in the first place was 
because loyal subjects were willing to denounce their neighbours to the 
authorities.46 Historians of the modern period, on the other hand, while recognizing 
that the authorities were more likely to record and emphasise rumours of a 
politically subversive nature, argue that such rumours were also likely to have been 
those ‘broadcast loudly enough to be heard by local officials… [surviving] the tests of 
public consumption to emerge unscuttled’. Here the audience is interpreted as a 
gatekeeper, preserving only those deemed the most politically significant or 
compelling.47 Those rumours that do survive, argues Timothy Johnson, do so ‘on the 
basis of natural selection’.48 Supplementing Viola’s identification of rumour as a 
powerful mechanism for peasant resistance, Johnson has proposed that ‘rumours 
embedded Soviet citizens within Soviet power, rather than [solely] removing them 
from it. [Rumours] straddled the boundaries between support and resistance, 
making them an ideal object of the study of the more ambiguous spaces between 
internalisation and rejection’.49 Here, rumour is transformed into a tool for 
positioning the individual beyond the false dichotomy of ‘consent’ and terror’, as 
Stargardt has observed of the final days of the Third Reich, allowing for a more 
sophisticated consideration by historians of the definition of state control and how 
contemporaries experienced it.50 Rumour is as much about accommodation as 
dissent.51  By understanding it, we understand the dynamics of power and how it is 
negotiated.  
 
Identity, gender and culture 
 
Rumour, then, does as much to bind the collective as to divide it. It is a means of 
community construction. Rumours about the corruption and greed of governments 
or social elites reinforced collective notions about the ways in which politics and 
social relations should function. Rumours about the private behaviour of prominent 
individuals reinforced popular notions of morality. The significance of the 
identification of the ‘Brigands’ during the Great Fear of 1789, as Ramsey has argued, 
lay not only in the permanence of the local militia in revolutionary France, as 
Lefebvre contended, but in ‘consensual notions about the production, sale and 
distribution of the food supply’.52 Just as communities coalesced around the politics 
of food and control of resources in France, so too peasants in the Soviet Union relied 
on a ‘thick web of rumour that served to unite the peasantry, allowing it to 
overcome regional peasant particularlism…. as well as…. social tensions and divisions 
within villages’.53  This was not a gentle process, nor one that commanded willing 
consensus. In this environment, rumour became as much a ‘coercive instrument of 
persuasion to reinforce community norms or ideals of cohesion and unity against the 
outside’ – as of binding residents around a set of collective values.54 In this way, the 
study of rumour has much in common with the history of emotions. Rumour has the 
potential to bind people in much the same way as Barbara H. Rosenwein’s notion of 
‘emotional communities’. Like emotions, rumour is well placed to uncover ‘systems 
of feeling; what… communities… define and assess as valuable or harmful to them …; 
the nature of the affective bonds between people that they recognise’, and indeed, 
in rumour, those that they do not even recognise, but that nonetheless may be 
revealed to the historian.55 
 
If rumour serves to illuminate forms of identity construction within 
communities, what might it reveal of race, class and gender?  It is striking that, 
regardless of period, contemporaries place women at the heart of discussions of 
rumour. Rumours are frequently gendered: one need only to think of the 
identification of rumour with the Greco-Roman goddess Fama, and the modern 
labelling of the phenomenon as ‘Dame Rumour’. Women serve as symbolic martyrs 
in atrocity stories,56 as the victims of sexual violence, murder or kidnap,57 or as 
especially vulnerable to the effects of rumour.  But why do women occupy a special 
place in the history of rumour? For Farge and Revel, female Parisians of the mid-
eighteenth century were in a position to seek out answers to the mystery of the 
missing children in that they were connected by a domestic network and were 
politically disenfranchised and thus considered less dangerous to the authorities.58  
Viola’s peasant women were grouped with ‘marginal figures’ – such as vagrants, 
beggars, and religious crackpots – as ‘gullible primitives’ who simply transmitted 
rumour without considering the political consequences, allowing for a focus on the 
dangers posed by the  ‘originators’ of seditious talk – the kulaks and priests.59   In the 
early modern period, it was a common assumption that women were more likely to 
gossip and to fall prey to the fear and anxiety that rumour induced, and this belief 
continued into the modern period. Whereas men would rely on ‘common sense’ to 
dispel false report, commented Thomas Chadwick, Vicar of All Saints Church in 
Darlaston, in 1932, ‘women are more prone to accept, believe and spread false 
rumour. The emotional element which is strong in woman also leads her to believe 
false rumours, especially if they are of a terrifying nature. A woman’s feelings govern 
her actions’.60 Such comments were, in part, based on assumption that women 
communicated within ‘closed’ networks, in which rumours could not be challenged 
or dispelled and indeed flourished in an environment of shared pre-existing beliefs 
and prejudices. So too scholars of rumours within different racial communities have 
explained that ‘black and whites are part of communications channels that do not 
overlap’.61 Such assumptions, whether true or false, also apply to social groups. 
During the early modern period, elites identified rumour with the supposedly 
irrational ‘vulgar multitude’. Yet rumours could transcend social boundaries. One of 
the remarkable aspects of the Great Fear of 1789, as Ramsey has argued, was that 
the notion of the ‘brigand’ was feared by local nobles and peasants alike.62  
  
Cultural attitudes towards rumour, and how these might have changed over 
time, play a central role in understanding popular engagement with the 
phenomenon and what it represented. While the psychological traits and impulses 
analysed by social scientists may be universal and timeless, the cultural context in 
which individual rumours are spread, assessed and interpreted is not. As Marc Bloch 
wrote, ‘Clouds have not changed their shapes since the Middle Ages, yet we no 
longer see in them either magical swords or miraculous crosses’.63 Hans-Joachim 
Neubauer’s anecdotal and obscurely written The Rumour: A Cultural History has not 
cast much light on the topic.64 Scholars like Philip Hardie and Keith Botelho have 
examined representations of rumour in ancient, medieval and early modern plays, 
prose and poetry with great success, but by focussing on the literary canon they 
inevitably ignore the ways in which rumour was represented by ordinary people and 
in other sources.65  
 Conclusion 
 
Clearly, there is much scope for further research on the phenomenon of rumour, 
particularly given its potential to provide an insight into the most elusive aspects of 
past mentalities and mindsets. In order to capitalise on the many revealing aspects 
of rumour as an object of historical study, historians must be willing to accept and 
work within the silences and tensions inherent in this unique source. At times, 
rumour sutures (sometimes unconnected) events together in what Shibutani deems 
an attempt at ‘collective problem solving… [where individuals or groups] construe a 
meaningful interpretation… by pooling intellectual resources’;66 at others, it 
fragments and challenges such notions, causing confusion and disorientation. 
Rumours sate the desire for information, a platform for ‘improvised news’ where 
official confirmation does not or cannot exist. This provides a form of psychological 
stability in which events appear to be ‘foreseen’ or ‘predictable’. But we must 
recognise that these feelings can sit alongside a sense of instability and a deep-
seated foreboding. This might explain how, in the midst of the collapse of the Third 
Reich,  ‘hope is nurtured’ in extreme circumstances by ‘utopian fantasy, hard to 
sustain and often coexisting with equally powerful fears and anxieties’. Rumours 
express distress, alarm and terror; but also hope, aspiration and wishful thinking. It 
does not matter to the historian, then, as Viola suggests, who started the rumour, 
the question becomes who shares it and why. And if we accept that rumour 
represents a strategy by which agency is sought and that those who pass on rumour 
do so in order to fulfil a psychological need, then rumour offers a means of probing 
human behaviours and motivations. It becomes a creative tool for ‘reconstructing’ 
past mental maps and understanding how societies interpreted the world around 
them. 
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